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Travelled to:
1 × Denmark
1 × France
1 × Portugal
1 × Switzerland
1 × United Kingdom
2 × Canada
2 × Greece
7 × USA
Collaborated with:
A.Roth R.Cole M.Sundararajan S.Leonardi K.Kollias D.Mosk-Aoyama J.D.Hartline J.Hsu S.Dughmi Q.Yan A.Ghosh Y.Dodis A.Gupta A.Kumar A.Globerson D.Sontag C.Yildirim J.Ullman H.C.Lin É.Tardos A.Walkover Z.Huang Z.S.Wu K.Bhawalkar J.M.Kleinberg K.Lewi A.Sharma
Talks about:
mechan (5) network (4) price (3) optim (3) privaci (2) auction (2) anarchi (2) privat (2) design (2) maxim (2)

Person: Tim Roughgarden

DBLP DBLP: Roughgarden:Tim

Facilitated 1 volumes:

STOC 2013Ed

Contributed to:

ICML 20152015
ICALP (1) 20142014
STOC 20142014
ICALP (2) 20122012
STOC 20122012
ICALP (2) 20112011
STOC 20112011
STOC 20102010
ICALP (2) 20092009
STOC 20092009
STOC 20082008
STOC 20062006
ICALP 20052005
STOC 20032003
STOC 20022002
STOC 20012001

Wrote 19 papers:

ICML-2015-GlobersonRSY #how #predict #question
How Hard is Inference for Structured Prediction? (AG, TR, DS, CY), pp. 2181–2190.
ICALP-v1-2014-HsuRRU #linear #source code
Privately Solving Linear Programs (JH, AR, TR, JU), pp. 612–624.
STOC-2014-ColeR #complexity
The sample complexity of revenue maximization (RC, TR), pp. 243–252.
STOC-2014-HsuHRRW
Private matchings and allocations (JH, ZH, AR, TR, ZSW), pp. 21–30.
ICALP-v2-2012-BhawalkarKLRS #network #problem #social
Preventing Unraveling in Social Networks: The Anchored k-Core Problem (KB, JMK, KL, TR, AS), pp. 440–451.
STOC-2012-LeonardiR #order
Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders (SL, TR), pp. 427–434.
ICALP-v2-2011-KolliasR #game studies
Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games (KK, TR), pp. 539–551.
STOC-2011-DughmiRY #combinator #optimisation #random #towards
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions (SD, TR, QY), pp. 149–158.
STOC-2010-RothR #interactive #privacy
Interactive privacy via the median mechanism (AR, TR), pp. 765–774.
ICALP-v2-2009-Mosk-AoyamaR #analysis #performance #worst-case
Worst-Case Efficiency Analysis of Queueing Disciplines (DMA, TR), pp. 546–557.
STOC-2009-GhoshRS #privacy
Universally utility-maximizing privacy mechanisms (AG, TR, MS), pp. 351–360.
STOC-2009-Roughgarden #robust
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy (TR), pp. 513–522.
STOC-2008-HartlineR #design
Optimal mechanism design and money burning (JDH, TR), pp. 75–84.
STOC-2006-RoughgardenS #trade-off
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms (TR, MS), pp. 79–88.
ICALP-2005-LinRTW #exponential #fibonacci
Braess’s Paradox, Fibonacci Numbers, and Exponential Inapproximability (HCL, TR, ÉT, AW), pp. 497–512.
STOC-2003-ColeDR #network
Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users (RC, YD, TR), pp. 521–530.
STOC-2003-GuptaKR #algorithm #approximate #design #network
Simpler and better approximation algorithms for network design (AG, AK, TR), pp. 365–372.
STOC-2002-Roughgarden #independence #network
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology (TR), pp. 428–437.
STOC-2001-Roughgarden #scheduling
Stackelberg scheduling strategies (TR), pp. 104–113.

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